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I. INTRODUCTION
While the exact definition of corporate governance should be
specifically tailored to the requirements of each jurisdiction in
which it is maintained, one concept utilized by both the United
* Florence Shu-Acquaye is a Professor of Law at the Shepard Broad Law Center of Nova
Southeastern University. She would like to thank Ms. Heather Last for her excellent
research assistance.
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States and Europe is consistent: Corporate governance relates to
some form of company "control."'
The European Union has very recently increased its list of
member states from fifteen to twentyseven with the recent
accession of Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia; and, with a total population in excess of 450
million, it is certainly a force in corporate governance to reckon
with.2 It is in the interest of other powerful industrialized
1. The definition of corporate governance per some European members' states is
worth noting. See COMM. ON FIN. ASPECTS OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 14 (1992) ("Corporate
governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled."); BERLIN
INITIATIVE GROUP, GERMAN CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4 (2000) ("Corporate
governance describes the legal and factual regulatory framework for managing and
supervising a company."); WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, EUR. COMM'N, COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES RELEVANT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS
MEMBER STATES, FINAL REPORT & ANNEXES I-III 28 tbl.1 (2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/company/docs/corpgov/corp-gov-codes-rpt-
partien.pdf [hereinafter COMPARATIVE STUDY] ("Corporate Governance is the goals,
according to which a company is managed, and the major principles and
frameworks...." (quoting NORBY COMM., CORP. GOVERNANCE IN DENMARK -
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOOD CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN DENMARK 1 (2001), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documentsl
haakap05-Oluk.pdf)); COMM'N OF THE EUR. CMTYS., COMMUNICATION FROM THE
COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: MODERNISING COMPANY
LAW AND ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION-A PLAN TO
MOVE FORWARD 10 n.10 (2003), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eulbexUriServ/site/
en/com/2003/com2003_0284en01.pdf [hereinafter COMM'N OF THE EUR. CMTYS]
(Principles issued by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
Governance (OECD) of 1999, (an ad-hoc task force on corporate governance), also known
as the OECD Principles, describe corporate governance as: "involv[ing] a set of
relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and
monitoring performance are determined.").
2. George L. Bustin et al., 2003 Annual Review of European Union Legal
Developments, 38 INT'L LAW. 639, 639 (2004); Romania and Bulgaria join the European
Union, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (EUR.), Dec. 31, 2006, available at http://www.iht.coml
articles/ap/2006/12/31/europe/EU_.GENRomaniaBulgariaEU.php (listing Romania
and Bulgaria as the two most recent states to join the European Union, pushing the total
to twentyseven). There have always been fundamental differences between Europe and
the United States over the conduct of international affairs that are not likely to diminish
anytime soon, but "the clashes reflect inevitable tensions between a United States that
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nations, such as the United States, to monitor trends set by the
European Union and for the country's corporate practitioners
and academicians to monitor the trends in corporate governance
and their implication for the United States. Not surprisingly,
the European Union has been doing just that with respect to
corporate governance trends in the United States. For example,
the European Commission (the Commission) in May 2003,
responding to recent corporate governance crises depicted by
Enron and its progeny and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 in the United States (SOX or the Act), "presented a
proposed 'Action Plan for Moderni[z]ing Company law and
Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU'."'3 This plan refers
to some of the same corporate governance challenges faced in
the United States, relating to such things as management
responsibilities, composition, and operation of the board and its
committees, shareholders' rights and how they can be exercised,
derivative suits, takeovers and mergers, public auditing and
public confidence in the audit profession, a reference to a code on
corporate governance designated for use at national level, and so
forth.4 The European Union and the United States have
feels its sole-superpower status gives it a broad entitlement to get its way in world
affairs and a uniting Europe that is struggling to become a more influential political and
economic actor on the global scene." Reginald Dale, European Union, Properly
Construed, POL'Y REV., Dec. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 39. Perhaps this is why the Europeans
think they are on the ascent in world affairs, that is, the European Union will "restore
Europe to its rightful place as a continental-scale economic and political grouping more
or less on a par with the United States." Id. at 41.
3. Bustin et al., supra note 2, at 647.
4. See COMM'N OF THE EUR. CMTYS., supra note 1, at 4, 8, 12, 16-17, 20-21; see
Bustin et al., supra note 2 (discussing a recent review of corporate developments in the
European Union). This group of High Level Company Law Experts was organized by the
European Commission in 2001 "to make recommendations on a modern regulatory
framework in the European Union for company law." EUR. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE
HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON A MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE 1 (2002). [hereinafter EUR. COMM'N, REPORT] The group
published this consultative document on the issues specified in their mandate. Id. at 43.
Four issues were discussed concerning corporate governance in section 3.1 of the
consultative document: 1) "[b]etter information for shareholders and creditors, in
particular better disclosure of corporate governance structures and practices, including
remuneration of board members;" 2) "[s]trengthening shareholders' rights and minority
protection, in particular supplementing the right to vote by special investigation
procedures;" 3) "[s]trengthening the duties of the board, in particular the accountability
20071
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identified basically the same broad problems and goals in
corporate governance (the importance of good corporate
governance for the investors and the economy); 5 however, unlike
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which imposes mandatory provisions
for U.S. companies (through a one-size-fits-all approach), the
corporate governance initiatives proposed in the E.U. Action
Plan are not intended to be mandatory. 6 The European
Commission stated "it d[id] not believe that a European
Corporate Governance Code would offer significant added value
but would simply add an additional layer between international
principles and national codes."'7 The Commission, in conceding
that "a self-regulatory market approach based on non-binding
recommendations" would be futile as sound corporate
governance, especially "[i]n view of the growing integration of
European capital markets," adopted in the Action Plan a
"common approach covering only certain essential rules[.]"'8 This
of directors where the company becomes insolvent;" and 4) "[n]eed for a European
corporate governance code or coordination of national codes in order to stimulate
development of best practice and convergence." Id.
"In a direct reaction to the Enron case, the Commission and the ECOFIN [Economic and
Financial Affairs Subcouncil of the Council for the European Union] have agreed to
extend the mandate of the Group to review 'issues related to best practices in corporate
governance and auditing, in particular: 0 the role of non-executive and supervisory
directors; 0 remuneration of management; 0 responsibility of management for financial
statements; a and auditing practices."' Id. (footnote omitted).
5. See Richard Y. Roberts et al., Spilt Milk: Parmalat and Sarbanes-Oxley Internal
Controls Reporting, 1 INT'L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 215, 222 (2004). Europe also
experienced its equivalent of America's Enron with Parmalat, a "corporate debacle
comparable in size and intricacy" to Enron that was dubbed "Europe's Enron." Claudio
Storelli, Corporate Governance Failures-Is Parmalat Europe's Enron?, 2005 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 765, 766 (2005). While the Parmalat catastrophe may have played out with
"some typically Italian or European aspects," it tended to exhibit strong "similarities to
the Enron scandal and other egregious examples of 'gatekeeper' failure." Id. at 768.
Hence, understanding the similarities and differences between the two corporate
scandals could be helpful in showing how "corporate governance systems across the
world could be improved." Id. See discussion of Parmalat infra note 12.
6. See Roberts et al., supra note 5, at 222.
7. Id.
8. Id. The rules covered by the European Commission's plan were:
1) The"[i]ntroduction of an Annual Corporate Governance Statement. Listed companies
should be required to include in their annual documents a 'coherent and descriptive
statement covering the key elements of their corporate governance structures and
[Vol. 29:3
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is typical of the European approach to corporate governance:
self-regulation through corporate governance codes, with public
companies then required to disclose whether or not they are in
compliance with such codes. 9
Consequently, a comparison of some of the corporate issues
in these two systems in light of recent laws and regulations may
not only be beneficial in understanding how each system
functions, but may also be helpful in drawing lessons from the
potential strengths and weaknesses of each system, thereby
fortifying global corporate governance principles. For example,
although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was drafted primarily
with the U.S. regulatory market in mind, it also "regulates non-
U.S. companies doing business in the U.S. capital markets
despite the fact foreign jurisdictions may already have their own
corporate governance regulatory schemes in place."'10 Foreign
practices."' Id.
2) "Development of a legislative framework aimed at helping shareholders to exercise
various rights (for example, asking questions, tabling resolutions, voting in absentia,
participating in general meetings via electronic means). These facilities should be offered
to shareholders across the EU, and specific problems relating to crossborder voting
should be solved urgently." Id.
3) "Adoption of a Recommendation aimed at promoting the role of (independent) non-
executive or supervisory directors. Minimum standards on the creation, composition and
role of the nomination, remuneration and audit committees should be defined at the EU
level and enforced by member states, at least on a 'comply or explain' basis." Id.
4) "Adoption of a Recommendation on Directors' Remuneration. Member states should be
rapidly invited to put in place an appropriate regulatory regime providing shareholders
with more transparency and influence, which includes detailed disclosure of individual
remuneration." Id.
5) "Creation of a European Corporate Governance Forum to help encourage coordination
and convergence of national codes and of the way that they are enforced and monitored."
Id.
9. Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to
Regulate Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REV. 849, 887-88 (2004).
10. Roberts et al., supra note 5, at 218. Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
requires "an annual evaluation of internal controls and procedures for financial
reporting" and that "management assess and vouch for the effectiveness of these
controls." Id. at 216. Subsection 404(a) requires both U.S. and non-U.S. issuers to file an
annual report with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) assessing their
internal controls, while Section 404(b) requires that the issuer's auditor must attest to,
and report on, the assessment of these internal controls. Id.
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companies doing business in the United States therefore would
find it in their best interests to understand the implications of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on their businesses. 11
This Article will present a general overview of the
aforementioned corporate governance issues and their
regulation in the United States in Part II. Parts III and IV will
critically analyze the new corporate laws and the issues raised
by crossborder application of these laws in the European Union,
highlighting the implications, similarities, and differences.
11. "Although the precedent for applying US securities laws to non-US companies
is of long standing, many in the European Union (EU), and elsewhere, have objected to
the unilateral application of Sarbanes-Oxley to non-U.S. companies" with the objection
being based on the fact "existing corporate governance regimes in Europe are more than
sufficient to prevent such scandals [and] frauds" such as Enron and WorldCom. Id. at
218. The demise of Parmalat in December 2003 apparently proved this to be wrong. See
id. at 219. Parmalat filed for bankruptcy in 2003 after acknowledging that its previous
claims of an existing U.S. bank account holding $5 billion (USD) in cash reserves were
actually untrue and that the account was nonexistent. Id. Investigators' examining how
Parmalat could have concealed its actual debt and raised $1.5 billion (USD) in debt
through bond issues led to discovery of, among other acts, reports of padded sales, the
use of "irregular" and "suspect" accounting methods, and failure to apply basic
accounting principles to account for expenses and losses. See id. (discussing how
Parmalat's control systems did not verify irregular account entries and how its loss could
increase if discovered that Parmalat further padded sales). Parmalat's irregular
practices were carried out over a decade and could have been alleviated or greatly
reduced by simple utilization of basic internal controls such as monitoring and review of
cash reporting methods. See id. at 219-20.
Two opposing views as to the applicability of SOX to foreign issues are "[o]n the one
hand, foreign issuer registrations and listings in the U.S. could decline" to the extent
that it is detrimental to the markets in New York and beneficial for markets abroad (the
London market in particular). See Karmel, supra note 9, at 886. On the other hand,
worldwide corporate-governance standards could be harmonized to those utilized in the
United States. See id. Indeed, one theory suggests that "in the context of increasingly
global capital markets, both within the European Union (EU) and worldwide, the best
way forward for the (EU) and the [United States] lies in the mutual recognition of each
other's corporate governance regimes, rather than the unilateral extraterritorial
application of corporate governance rules." Edward Greene & Pierre-Marie Boury,
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Governance in Europe and the USA: Americanisation or
Convergence?, 1 INT'L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 21, 22 (2003).
[Vol. 29:3
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II. SOME GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE CORPORATE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
In the traditional model of corporate structure, the board of
directors manages the business of the corporation. 12 Although
boards generally do continue to maintain this central legal role,
it is widely understood that the traditional managing model of
the board is no longer accurate; rather, under modern corporate
practice, the executives of the corporation hold the management
function, not the board members. 13 Because the "managing
model" is now an unrealistic description, especially in the last 25
years, the shift from a "managing model" to a "monitoring
model" recognizes management function is exercised not by the
board but by senior executives of the corporation. 14 Hence, in the
classic governance theory with a separation of powers, the role
of the board is to oversee and limit the exercise of power by the
executive officers; the board is, in turn, accountable to the
shareholders. 15 Consequently, "[b]y making executive officers
responsible to directors and then making directors directly
responsible to shareholders, the framework rests on the ability
of the shareholders effectively to monitor and respond to the
directors' oversight of the corporation."1 6  This intended
hierarchy between the board and management was commonly
reversed in the past, however, with the directors' incentive to
properly monitor management undercut by some factors.
17
12. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS CASES AND
MATERIALS 198 (9th ed. unabr., 2005).
13. See id.
14. Id. at 199.
15. Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 26.
16. See id. at 26-27.
17. Id. These factors include: "the compromised status of officers serving in a dual
capacity as directors; domination of the board by executive directors, particularly where
a majority of the board lacked independence; control by management of the supply of
information to directors; the lack of sufficiently empowered or vigorous board
committees; and subversion of non-executive directors' independence through
connections with management, such as consulting contracts, and other business links."
Id. at 27.
The issue of various constraints on the composition of the board is also an important
factor to consider-"[t]he typical board includes a number of directors who are
economically or psychologically tied to the corporation's executives, [especially] the
2007]
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"Today, the monitoring model of the board has been almost
universally accepted and adopted [by] large publicly held
corporations" in the United States.'8 It is inadequate to say that
"the monitoring model of the board rests on its economic
advantage in providing an additional system to monitor the
efficiency of management-in particular, of the CEO."'19
But looking at the board from either a managing or
monitoring perspective, the board of directors is made up of
individuals selected by shareholders of a company 20 and is the
ultimate decision-making body of a company. 21 The board selects
the senior management team, acts as the advisor and counselor
to the senior management, and ultimately monitors its
CEO." See EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 198. Because a number of board seats are
usually held by inside directors who are also executives of the corporation, the inside
director is somewhat dependent on the CEO for both retention and promotion, and on
other executives for day-to-day support. Id. He is therefore unlikely to dissent at a board
meeting from a line of action determined by the CEO. See id.; Florence Shu-Acquaye,
Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited: Lessons Learned in Light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 3 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 19, 48 (2004) [hereinafter Smith v. Van Gorkom
Revisited] (discussing the diminished "independent" character of board of directors and
the compromised ability to monitor the governance of the company).
However, given the board's function of monitoring senior executives, proper and effective
management of a corporation requires that the board consist of at least a majority of
independent directors-independent of the executives. See discussion infra Part III.C.
(discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its impact abroad).
18. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 200; see also discussion infra Part II.
19. See EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 200.
20. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.28 (1991). The state laws and articles of
incorporation or bylaws determine the manner by which the directors are elected to the
board. Id. A company may have a unitary board or staggered board of directors. See
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.06. In a unitary board system all directors stand for election
each year, whereas with a staggered board, the directors are typically grouped into three
classes. Id. In Section 8.06, the Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA) provides for
the classification of a staggered board into two or three groups of as equal size as
possible, with one class of directors standing for election each year. See CHARLES
O'KELLY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
192 (3d ed. 1999). Theoretically, staggered terms ensure that a corporation will always
have experienced directors in office; practically, two annual meetings would be required
to replace a majority of the board of directors. Id. This invariably means that even a
majority shareholder cannot easily change corporate policy by simply electing an entirely
new board. Id.
21. See O'KELLY & THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 155. The directors' management
power is exercised collectively, and individual directors are not given agency powers to
deal with outsiders. Id.
[Vol. 29:3
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performance. 22 Hence, the directors and management are said to
have a contract with the corporation.23 In fact, the corporation is
often described as an organization consisting of a nexus of
contracts 24 involving the employees, suppliers, contractors,
shareholders, directors, and the corporation. 25 The agreement
between the directors and the corporation is the most important
contract because it relates to the directors' duties and
obligations to the corporation.
26
A director's powers to act on behalf of the corporation are
derived from the state of incorporation. This regulation of the
corporation by the laws of the state of incorporation is often
22. Id. at 155-56. The MBCA, which has been adopted by over thirty states (with
some variation in certain states), provides that all corporate powers shall be exercised by
or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and that the business
and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to
the oversight, of the board of directors. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b); see also MELVIN
A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS STATUTES, RULES,
MATERIALS, AND FORMS 747 (2004) [hereinafter EISENBERG SUPPLEMENT]. The Delaware
Code imports the same principle as the MBCA. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005).
The language of the MBCA emphasizes the board's responsibility to oversee
management of the corporation. See EISENBERG SUPPLEMENT, supra at 747-48.
23. See O'KELLY & THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 45-46 (identifying contractual
"relationships between and among [a corporation's] owners, agents, creditors, customers,
and affected communities").
24. See Michael C. Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
(formulating the argument that a corporation is a nexus of contracts); Contra Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual
Nature of The Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999) [hereinafter Nexus of Contracts] (arguing
that the nexus of contracts description of a corporation is inadequate, given a
corporation's dual nature of reciprocal arrangements and a bureaucratic hierarchy).
Eisenberg stated that "[c]orporate law is constitutional law; that is, its dominant
function is to regulate the manner in which the corporate institution is constituted, to
define the relative rights and duties of those participating in the institution, and to
delimit the powers of the institution vis-h-vis the external world." MELVIN A. EISENBERG,
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (1976).
25. Nexus of Contracts, supra note 24, at 822.
26. This is why it "is not surprising that fiduciary duties are used to describe the
shareholder-manager relationship but not for other relationships, such as the creditor-
manager relationship." See Robert B. Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a
Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377, 390 (1990). A shareholder's residual return "depends on
the discretionary performance of another," and should "require[] a different protection
than the creditor's fixed return with a senior claim to the assets of the enterprise." Id.
2007]
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referred to as the "internal affairs doctrine. ' 27 Consequently,
state law, among other things, defines the directors' powers over
the corporation; 28 in this vein, corporations are said to be the
"'creatures of state law[,]' and it is state law that is the font of
corporate directors' powers. ' 29 Whether state regulation results
in efficient corporate law rules has been a scholarly debate.
Some scholars espouse the view that, because the grants of
corporate charters result in state tax revenue, 30 states tend to
adopt statutes that are management friendly at the expense of
shareholders. 3 1 Companies incorporated in Delaware are often
said to be involved in "a race to the bottom. '32 Regardless as to
27. See O'KELLY & THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 163. The internal affairs doctrine
is also known as a choice of law rule because courts look to the laws of the incorporating
state to determine the basic rights and duties applicable to a corporation. Id.
28. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE Director Independence
Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370, 396 (2002). State law for example, determines
the vote required to elect directors, powers of the shareholders to remove directors prior
to the end of their term in office, etc. See id. at 397.
29. Id. at 397 (citation omitted); see also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979)
(stating "it is state law that is the font of corporate directors' power"). However, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC rules of implementation are said to have encroached
upon state rights not only by regulating the internal affairs of the corporations, but also
by being extensive in scope. See Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 23. For example, the
Act "assign[ed] particular responsibilities and tasks to executive officers in areas where
previously matters were generally left to their discretion and that of the board," and it
also mandated specific forms of corporate organization. Id.; see also discussion infra
Part II.
30. The state of Delaware, the home of many publiclytraded corporations, derives
about 30% of its state budget from corporate charters. Florence Shu-Acquaye, The
Taxonomy of Director's Fiduciary Duty of Care: United States and Cameroon, 22 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 585, 587 n.5 (2003) [hereinafter Taxonomy of Director's
Fiduciary Duty].
31. O'KELLY & THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 163. This is the case because
corporate managers decide upon the state of incorporation. Id. As incorporators, the
owners of a firm may shop around and choose to incorporate in whichever state offers the
most attractive rules. Id.
32. See Roberta Romaneo, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 720-25 (1987) (discussing in detail the concept of race to the
bottom); O'KELLY & THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 165; Taxonomy of Director's Fiduciary
Duty, supra note 30, at 587 n.5; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom"
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.
L. REV. 913 (1982); but see William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 715, 722 (1998) (discussing evidence rejecting the race to the bottom
hypothesis).
[Vol. 29:3
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whether companies are racing to "the top" or to "the bottom,"
their state of incorporation determines how the board of
directors, as the managing head of the company, is to exercise
authority. This exercise of authority may, however, be subject to
limitations placed by the shareholders in the articles of
incorporation or bylaws.
33
III. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ABROAD
The unforeseen and shocking demise of companies-such as
Enron, Adelphia Communications, WorldCom, Quest, and a few
others-propelled Congress to approve the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission's (SEC) recommendation to pass the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as a means to boost investors'
confidence. 34 "This failure of corporate governance, [compounded
by] an enduring bear market, approaching mid-term elections
and uncertainty about terrorism and war, placed the federal
government under extraordinary pressure to act. ' 35 Hence, the
passage of the Act was only natural. The Act has been said to be
unprecedented because, in addition to regulating disclosure and
securities trading, the traditional jurisdiction of U.S federal
securities laws, 36 the law also addresses matters of substantive
Michael Klausner, on the other hand, believes the incorporation influx to Delaware is
based on "network externality." See EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 205. He analogizes this
to using a particular software, such as Microsoft: "[j]ust as it may be desirable to
use ... Microsoft Windows, whether or not it is better than other software, just because
so many other people use it and are familiar with it, so it may be better to incorporate in
Delaware, whether or not Delaware is better than [any] other state law, just because so
many other corporations use and are familiar with it." Id. (citing Michael Klausner,
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Network of Contract, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995)).
33. O'KELLY & THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 162. The articles of incorporation set
forth the terms of a corporation's existence, usually filed with a state agency or office
(usually the secretary of state) when the corporation is created. Id. at 161. Hence, these
articles are public records that can be accessed by anyone, whereas the bylaws are
internal administrative rules that are established after the corporation has been created,
and therefore not public documents per se. Id. at 163.
34. See D&O Market Still Faces Unresolved Securities Cases, INS. J., July 19, 2004,
http://www.insurancejournai.com/magazines/east/2004/07/19/features/44601.htm; Greene
& Boury, supra note 11, at 26 (stating that the United States will restore confidence
through Sarbanes-Oxley).
35. See Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 22.
36. "Although the federal securities laws generally have been considered full-
disclosure statutes, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission... has been
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corporate governance and executive fiduciary responsibility.
37
These duties have historically been viewed as a prerogative of
the states and self-regulatory organizations (SROs).38 Whether
these corporate scandals should call for more regulation is a
scholarly debate between those favoring regulation and those
favoring deregulation. 39 SOX has been said to have been
significantly costly and the benefits elusive.40 While the merits
of the debate are significant, understanding the changes brought
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is imperative to comprehending its
broader impact beyond. U.S. borders. This Article will now
examine some of these changes.
A. Corporate Auditing
One of the major innovations of the Act was the creation of a
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Oversight Board),
a quasi-public accounting board that oversees audits of public
companies that are subject to the securities laws.41 The
principal purpose of the Oversight Board is to protect the
interests of investors and to engage public interest in the
"preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit
interested in regulating the corporate governance of public corporations to the extent it
has any authority to do so. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... established the SEC
to administer both the Exchange Act and the earlier Securities Act of 1933 .... At that
time, responsibility for regulating internal corporate affairs was left generally to state
corporation law, state blue sky statutes, and stock-exchange-listing requirements."
Karmel, supra note 9, at 849-50.
37. Michael Hein et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Effects Sweeping Changes
to the U.S. Federal Securities Laws, GTALERT, Aug. 2002, at 1.
38. Id.
39. See Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 23. Deregulators argue that the
scandals are a result of "over-confidence in the integrity of the markets stemming from
their over-regulation ... " Id. Hence, the passage of SOX accordingly was largely a
duplication of existing laws. Id.
40. Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, (Ill. Law & Econ. Working
Papers Series, Paper No. LE05-016, 2005) 21-22, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-746884. For a detailed understanding of the resulting costs
from SOX, see id. at 7-19. These costs impact not only U.S companies, but also those
non-U.S. firms that list or otherwise sell securities in the U.S., especially those firms
that do not have U.S.-style governance structure. Id. at 16-17.
41. See EISENBERG SUPPLEMENT, supra note 22, at 1970.
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reports."42 This is a sort of a new federal "watchdog" for
regulation of the public accounting profession. "Although the
[Oversight Board] is not technically a government agency, it is
closer to a full government agency than to a [SRO] or industry-
based group such as the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, which ha[s] been performing the standard-setting
function since 1939. ''4 3  The Oversight Board's specific
responsibilities include: "the registration and inspection of all
'public accounting firms that prepare audit reports' for public
companies; the adoption and modification of 'auditing, quality
control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to
the preparation of audit reports' for public company audits; the
investigation of registered firms for violations of rules relating to
audits; and the imposition of sanctions for such violations. ' 44
Likewise, SOX contains some auditor-independence provisions
that affect auditors, audit committee members, executives, and
directors of public corporations; hence, an auditor for an issuer
is prohibited from providing a list of nonaudit services. 45 In the
same vein, rotation of an audit partner is required every five
years, and anyone who was employed by an auditor for an issuer
within a one-year period is prohibited from becoming the CEO,
controller, CFO, or chief accounting officer of the issuer.4
6
While the Oversight Board's proposal has been generally
hailed as appealing to resolving accounting problems in public
corporations, it is not without its own shortcomings. The
Oversight Board standards require external auditors to consider
42. See id.
43. Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 25. A majority of its members were required
to be external to the accounting profession, and the Oversight Board is subject to the
SEC's supervision and approval of its standards. Id.
44. Karmel, supra note 9, at 877 (citation omitted).
45. See id. at 878. This includes: "(1) bookkeeping... ; (2) financial information
systems designs and implementation; (3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness
opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit
outsourcing services; (6) management functions or human resources; (7) broker or dealer,
investment advisor, or investment banking services; (8) legal services and expert
services unrelated to the audit; and (9) any other service that the [Oversight Board]
determines, by regulation is impermissible." Id. at 878-79 (citation omitted); see also
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201(g), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j-1(g) (LexisNexis 2005).
46. Karmel, supra note 9, at 879 (citation omitted).
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audit committee effectiveness as part of their overall review of a
corporation's internal control over financial reporting.
47
According to Professor Cunningham, the Oversight Board
reveals a flaw in the corporate governance system as a result of
a mixture of state and federal law regulations. 48 He contends
that, although audit committees are essential, no one other than
boards and, after the fact, shareholders and courts should have
the power to oversee them.49 However, according to him, what
SOX did was simply mandate characteristics and functions,
while SEC and SROs mandated characteristic reports.50 The
disclosure to the Oversight Board requires auditors to include an
audit committee review as part of the auditors' more general
assessment of the company's internal control over financial
reporting. 51 Cunningham asserts this results in major problems:
First, it highlights the tension between state and federal law, as
state corporation law empowers the board to choose the
appropriate management tools for a corporation, while federal
law mandates specific parameters of the audit function. 52 In this
case, neither of these is complete, and even when combined, are
still incomplete. 53 Second, the issue of how to monitor the
monitors becomes imminent. The federally-prescribed audit
47. See PUBLIC ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2: AN
AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION
WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT 1, 55-59 app. (2004). It is also worth noting,
under the new standards, auditors must not only perform an audit of internal controls
and provide opinions for financial statement users, they can also be found liable as a
matter of law for failure to disclose certain control irregularities and their effects on the
auditor's substantive testing as well. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating
Auditing's New Early Warning System: Control Disclosure, Auditor Liability and Safe
Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1449, 1450 (2004). In the same vein, auditors, when giving
such opinions on controls, are likely to become primary actors, exposed to liability to
financial statement users when their disclosures concerning control effectiveness are
materially misstated. Id.
48. Lawrence Cunningham, A New Product for the State Corporation Law Market:
Audit Committee Certifications, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 327, 331 (2004) [hereinafter New
Product].
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. New Product, supra note 48, at 331.
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committee is directed to supervise the external auditor, and the
Oversight Board proposes to have the external auditor evaluate
the audit committee. 54 While these evaluations may be feasible,
it remains to be seen how they fit in squarely with state law.55
In sum, SOX provided the SEC the authority to restructure
corporate audit committees: 56 the SEC may authorize the SROs
to change their listing rules to meet certain standards, and
mandate them to require a public company to disclose whether
its audit committee includes a financial expert or explain why it
does not.57 This specific grant of authority to the SEC to
54. Id. at 332.
55. See id; see id at 331-34 (discussing how these problems may be addressed).
56. The SEC began advocating for audit committees comprised of independent
directors as early as 1941, although it took no action on this idea until years later (in the
1970s), when it brought several enforcement cases in which there were consent
injunctions ordering board restructuring that would reflect a board majority of
independent directors. Karmel, supra note 9, at 870; see also SEC v. Killearn Props.,
No. TCA-75-67, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16073, at *4-5 (N.D. Fla. May 2, 1977); SEC v.
Mattel, Inc., No. 74 Civ. 1185, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6489, at *12-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 1,
1974).
57. The SEC, under the mandate of the Act, indicates the required standard for
this expert. The Act mandated that financial statement issuers maintain an audit
committee comprised of at least one financial expert. It left the definition of "financial
expert" to the SEC, but provided suggestions for the Commission to consider areas in
which such expert should have understanding and experience. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 407, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7265(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2005).
The SEC considered its own requirements and suggestions from the Act and issued a
proposed definition for financial expert by soliciting comments from the financial and
corporate community. Based upon consideration of comments received by the SEC, the
Commission concluded that its original proposed definition was more restrictive than
necessary to satisfy Congressional intent. See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and
407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5111, 5113 (Jan. 31, 2003).
The Commission's final definition for the purpose of financial statement filing
requirements is for an "audit committee financial expert" rather than a "financial
expert," and requires of such an expert the following attributes:
[i] An understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and
financial statements; [ii] The ability to assess the general application of such
principles in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals and
reserves; [iii] Experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating
financial statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of
accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth and
complexity of issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised by the
small business issuer's financial statements, or experience actively
supervising one or more persons engaged in such activities; [iv] An
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regulate the structure and duties of the audit committee and the
substantive standards contained in SOX affected entrenched
governance norms by taking authority away from management
and placing it in the hands of the audit committee.
58
The next issue to consider is how these requirements and
regulations affect foreign companies. As expected, foreign
companies and countries doing business in the United States did
not necessarily welcome the application of SOX,5 9 and some took
steps to put their own corporate governance reforms in place,
possibly to preempt Enron-like occurrences. 60 The government of
the United Kingdom, for example, "initiated a series of reviews,
primarily under the auspices of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) to examine whether changes were necessary to
regimes for the regulation of the UK audit and corporate
governance." 61 In the same vein, The House of Commons
Treasury Committee initiated its own inquiry: the Higgs
understanding of internal control over financial reporting; and [v] An
understanding of audit committee functions.
Integrated Disclosure System for Small Business Issuers, 17 C.F.R.
§ 228.407(d)(5)(ii)(A)-(E) (2005).
Further, the SEC mandates that such attributes be acquired through any of the
following four areas:
[i] Education and experience as a principal financial officer, principal
accounting officer, controller, public accountant or auditor or experience in
one or more positions that involve the performance of similar functions; [ii]
Experience actively supervising a principal financial officer, principal
accounting officer, controller, public accountant, auditor or person
performing similar functions; [iii] Experience overseeing or assessing the
performance of companies or public accountants with respect to the
preparation, auditing or evaluation of financial statements; or [iv] Other
relevant experience.
Id. § 228.407(d)(5)(iii)(A)-(D).
58. Karmel, supra note 9, at 873.
59. Id. at 887-88.
60. Id.
61. See Ian P. Dewing & Peter 0. Russell, Post-Enron Developments in UK Audit
and Corporate Governance Regulation, 11 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 309, 309 (2003).
Some key recommendations of the DTI Report are that the independent regulator should
have clear arrangements for accountability and transparency, and the recognition of
professional supervisory bodies and qualifications should be delegated to an independent
regulator and assumed by the Professional Oversight Board (POB). Id. at 312.
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Report, 62 the Smith Report on corporate governance, 63 and the
Coordinating Group on Audit and Accounting Issues (CGAA)
were all welcomed and considered. 64 In particular, the 2003
CGAA report not only considered the issues of auditor
independence, corporate governance, audit firm transparency,
financial reporting standards and enforcement, and monitoring
of audit firms; it also identified twentyseven conclusions and
recommendations supporting initiatives including, inter alia,
audit partner rotation by the Institute of Chartered Accountants
in England and Wales (ICAEW), a principlesbased approach to
financial reporting and auditing standards by the Accounting
Standard Board (ASB) and, at an international level, by the
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) and the
International Auditing and Assurance Standard Board
(IAASB).65 Other related reports on corporate governance
include: the Greenbury Report, which focuses on disclosure of
62. The Higgs Report was issued in January 2003 and dealt with the review of the
role and effectiveness of nonexecutive directors. DEREK HIGGS, REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 5-6 (Jan. 2003), http://www.dti.gov.uk/
files/file23012.pdf. The Higgs Report has been criticized in the United Kingdom as a
rulebook and a step too far toward the U.S.-style rulesbased approach to corporate
governance. See Allison Dabbs Garrett, Themes and Variations: The Convergence of
Corporate Governance Practices in Major World Markets, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. POL'Y 147,
172 n.144 (2004) (citing Alexandra Johnson, Kelley Rejects Higgs Criticism as 'Disturbing
Complacency,' ACCOUNTANCYAGE, Mar. 12, 2003, http://www.accountancyage.com/
News/1132858.
63. The Combined Code Guidance, which is proposed by a Financial Reporting
Council-appointed group chaired by Sir Robert Smith (the Smith Report), reviews the
role and effectiveness of nonexecutive directors. ROBERT SMITH, FINANCIAL REPORTING
COUNCIL, AUDIT COMMITTEES COMBINED GUIDANCE CODE § 3.1 (Jan. 2003),
http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/ACReport.pdf; see also Gregory
Maassen et al., The Importance of Disclosure in Corporate Governance Self-Regulation
Across Europe: A Review of the Winter Report and the EU Action Plan, 1 INT'L J.
DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 146, 148, 151 (2004).
64. Dewing & Russell, supra note 61, at 310.
65. Id. at 311. For more specific recommendations concerning transparency of
audit firms and enforcement of accounting standards, read regulation concerning post-
Enron development in U.K. audit and corporate governance. Id. at 309-13.
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director pay;66 and the Hampe167 and Turnbell Reports, which
review companies' approaches to internal controls.
68
Likewise, the Canadian securities regulators in keeping
abreast with the spirit of SOX (boasting investor's confidence)
and aligning their corporate governance rules with those of the
United States, unveiled initiatives in 2003 with regard to
auditor oversight, officer certifications in companies' reports,
and audit committees. 69 The Chairman of the Ontario Securities
Commission requested the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants to address issues of audit independence and
rotation of engagement partners and firms.
70
The European Union Commission was concerned that
European company issuers and auditors would be unfairly
treated (because they were alieady subject to stringent
measures in their home markets) and that added regulation
would only impose unnecessary burdens and costs. 7 1 Indeed, a
letter from Alexander Schaub, director-general of the
Directorate-General for Internal Market and Services at the
European Commission, to the then-Secretary of the SEC,
66. Garrett, supra note 62, at 171.
67. This report was issued in 1998 and became the Combined Code on Corporate
Governance (supplemented by the Turnbell Report), which applies to all listed
companies in the United Kingdom and requires that nonexecutive directors comprise at
least one half of the total number of members on each board of directors. See FINANCIAL
REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 83 (July 2003),
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Web Optimised Combined Code 3rd
proof.pdf.
68. See Garrett, supra note 62, at 171.
69. Karmel, supra note 9, at 890. Corporate governance issues are complicated in
Canada, however, because of the lack of a single national agency regulating securities.
Garrett, supra note 62, at 161. There are thirteen provincial and territorial agencies
responsible for the regulation of securities in Canada, which may explain the lack of
harmonization among the provinces; this factor is only further complicated by bickering
amongst the many provincial securities regulators. Id. In British Columbia and Alberta,
for example, regulators favor a principlebased regulatory scheme, while regulators in
Ontario favor a rulesbased scheme patterned after SOX. Id.
70. See Garrett, supra note 62, at 163.
71. Maria Camilla Cardilli, Regulation Without Borders: The Impact of Sarbanes-
Oxley on European Companies, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 785, 791 (2004). For example,
Germany enacted the Transparency and Publicity Act (TransPUG) in 2002 covering
disclosure, transparency and accounting issues. See Garrett, supra note 62, at 166. This
became effective on January 1, 2003. Id.
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Jonathan Katz, belabored this point.72 Regardless of what the
rationale was for not wanting SOX to apply to these foreign
companies, the enactment of SOX and its application
undoubtedly extended to all foreign companies listed in the
United States and their auditors, regardless of origin.73 In other
words, companies and auditors based in other countries or
jurisdictions came under the direct jurisdiction of the United
States authorities regardless of the legal and economic culture
in their own country. 74 European Union auditors preparing or
72. See Cardilli, supra note 71, at 791-92 n.31 (citing Letter from Alexander
Schaub, Director General of the European Commission, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary of
the SEC (Feb. 18, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/
aschaubl.htm. The letter states, in part:
We request full recognition of equivalence of EU corporate governance
systems.... [T]he SEC should be aware that EU companies and auditors are
already subject to longstanding, well developed [m]ember [s]tate corporate
governance requirements. These are tailored to their specific legal
environments and are in their different ways as effective and efficient at
providing investors protection as U.S. rules. Additional requirement of the
[Sarbanes-Oxley Act] applied to EU companies and auditors would place on
them an unnecessary additional layer of requirements-taken from
completely different (US) corporate governance environment. We fail to see
why EU companies and auditors should be overburdened with such
duplicative requirements compared to their US counterparts .... Bearing
this in mind, the SEC should recognize the equivalence of E.U. corporate
governance systems and thus fully exempt not only EU lawyers but also EU
companies and auditors from the [provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley], also with
regard to audit committee requirements.
Id.
The SEC has, however, generally attempted to accommodate concerns of foreign issuers.
With respect to the audit committee independence requirements, the SEC has clarified
that employee representatives sitting on the board of directors or audit committee
pursuant to home country law or listing requirements will count as independent. See
Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 30.
73. "In the past, foreign companies benefited from a general exemption from the
application of American corporate governance rules[;]" foreign listed companies in the
United States were "simply required to disclose their corporate governance
arrangements[,] a solution that created no interference with the internal organization of
most foreign issuers." See Cardilli, supra note 71, at 792. The underlying premise for this
was the recognition of other national legal systems' ability to assure equivalent levels of
investor protection. Id. This practice encouraged the listing of these foreign companies in
the U.S. markets without necessarily triggering the complications that adapting to a
system different from their own would have created. Id.
74. Dewing & Russell, supra note 61, at 318. It has also been said that the Act was
passed with such haste (in an election year) that Congress did not apparently take the
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involved in providing audit reports for their companies listed in
the United States, were, for example, subject to the Oversight
Board. 75 Should SOX, therefore, apply only to U.S. companies,
thus excluding foreign companies? Given the number of foreign
issuer registrants and international competition for investments
and capital, it is harder for the SEC to apply a stringent rule to
U.S. companies and not to foreign companies. 76 One of the risks
inherent in the applicability of SOX to non-U.S issuers is that
some of the Act's provisions may conflict with those in force in
the companies' country of incorporation. 77 Because corporate
governance laws tend to emanate from the country of
incorporation, such laws may be very different-different legal
systems, different regulations and accepted practices prevailing
with a country that may conflict with those of SOX.78 It was
even observed that some foreign-listed companies considered
delisting from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or SEC
because of SOX.79 Looking at some particular provisions and its
impact on foreign companies is therefore imperative.
B. Provisions relating to CEO and CFO; Criminal Sanctions
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the SEC
adopt rules requiring the CEO and CFO of a public company in
each quarterly and annual report to personally vouch for the
accuracy of the report, and to certify the accuracy of the
company's financial statements and that the company has
adopted adequate internal controls.80 As stated earlier, this
time to consider whether it was appropriate to include foreign issuers in the statutory
framework. See Karmel, supra note 9, at 862.
75. Dewing & Russell, supra note 61, at 318.
76. Karmel, supra note 9, at 891.
77. Cardilli, supra note 71, at 791. European businesses, while in favor of improved
corporate governance standards, were not very happy with the applicability of SOX to
their companies. Id.
78. Id. Such concerns were expressed by the Union of Industrial and Employers'
Confederation of Europe (UNICE)-an authoritative representative of business in
Europe. Id.
79. See Karmel, supra note 9, at 887 (noting a February 2003 comment letter from
the NYSE regarding the SEC's proposed audit committee standards).
80. Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts
on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495,
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means, based on their knowledge, these executives claim the
reports filed with the SEC do not contain any material
misstatement or omission.8 1 In particular, the CFO and CEO
must certify: 1) that the financial statements and other financial
information included in the reports are true and correct, and
fairly present the financial conditions and results of operations
of the issuer; and 2) that the company has implemented effective
disclosure controls and procedures to assure transparency.8 2 The
conflict of this requirement with those of other countries is
obvious; in Germany and France, the laws basically provide for
the collegial responsibility of CEOs and CFOs with respect to
the truthfulness and accuracy of financial statements.
83
Similarly, English corporate governance rules ignore the
individual certification requirement and look to the collective
responsibility of the board for the company's account.
84
Likewise, under Italian law, the annual accounts of a company
are prepared by the entire board of directors on a collegial
basis.8 5 Consequently, the SOX requirement that the CEO and
CFO individually certify the accounts transforms what was an
internal responsibility to the company into a responsibility to all
third parties. 86
516 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); see Florence Shu-Acquaye, The
Independent Board of Directors and Governance in the United States: Where Is This
Heading?, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 725 (2006) [hereinafter Where Is This Heading?]
(discussing the interplay of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, fiduciary duties, and corporate
governance on the whole); Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited, supra note 17.
81. See discussion supra Part III.A.
82. Cardilli, supra note 71, at 793. Also, the only exemptions from such executive
certification requirements are employee benefit plans and 8-K reports. See id. at 794
n.41 (citing JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 675
(3d ed. 2001)).
83. Id. at 794; see also id. at 794 n.43 (referring to the French Code de Commerce
L225-251, and in particular Article L232-1, concerning the preparation of the corporate
balance sheets by the board of directors). In the same vein, the German Stock
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) 93-11 recognizes the responsibility of the whole
Vorstand. Id.
84. Id. at 794.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Section 304, which deals with forfeiture of certain bonuses
and profits, requires the CEO and CFO to reimburse the
company for any bonus, incentive, equitybased compensation, or
any profit from the sale of securities of the company, received
during the twelve months prior to any earnings restatement if
such compensation is the result of material noncompliance by
the company with any financial reporting requirements under
the federal securities law.87 This section appears to make the
CEO and CFO responsible for reimbursing their bonuses and
profits to the issuer even where others are found to have been
responsible for the misconduct that led to the issuer's violation,
and even if the CEO and CFO were not at all involved in the
misconduct. Although this provision does not appear to have an
equivalent rule in most European jurisdictions, it does create a
problem of double regulation:88  under Italian corporate
governance rules, for example, the possibility of bringing actions
that would require the directors to return a part of their
compensation seems to exist only when those directors have
caused harm to the corporation through failure to carry out their
duties to the corporation.8 9 France, on the other hand,
recognizes the possibility for criminal jurisdictions to fine
directors by an amount up to ten times the gains earned by
directors in violation, although such sanctions could only be
provided in the context of an action for damages. 90 Hence,
France has no equivalence to SOX Section 304.91
Section 305 expands the SEC's ability to remove directors
and officers and bar them from serving as such in a publiclyheld
corporation by showing their unfitness to serve on the board as a
result of violating the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws. 92 The standard used prior to implementation of the section
87. Paredes, supra note 80, at 516; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304(a)(1)-(2), 15
U.S.C.S. § 7243(a)(1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2005).
88. Cardilli, supra note 71, at 797.
89. Id. at 797-98.
90. Id. at 798.
91. Id.
92. See Paredes, supra note 80, at 516; DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 5 (2002), http://www.abanet.org/rppt/
publications/edirt/2002/sarbanes/dorsey.pdf.
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was "substantial unfitness," which was apparently a higher
standard and therefore more difficult to show than the section's
requirement to show mere "unfitness.
'93
Section 906 provides for stiff criminal sanctions for CEOs
and CFOs who fail to comply with certain financial certification
requirements in addition to those under section 302. 94 Section
906 imposes a $1 million fine (USD), 10 years in prison, or both
for persons who knowingly violate the certification requirement;
and a $5 million (USD) fine, 20 years in prison, or both for
willful violation of the provision. 95 In addition to the increased
maximum criminal penalties, SOX also directed the U.S.
Sentencing Commission 96  to review and amend federal
sentencing guidelines for a number of criminal offenses relating
to securities and accounting fraud; hence, the new guidelines
which were already increased in 2002 were again increased in
2003 in response to the mandate contained in the Act. 97 The
overall result is sentencing is now far more severe in the United
States than it is in other countries. For example, under the new
guidelines, the penalty for a CEO guilty of certain significant
accounting frauds is life imprisonment, far more severe than the
penalty for the federal crime of murder, which is imprisonment
for 30 years to life.
98
This Act was tested as Richard Scrushy, former CEO of
HealthSouth Corp, "was acquitted of all eighty-five counts with
which he was charged, including one of knowingly certifying
93. 15 U.S.C. 77t(e), 78u(d)(2), (2000), amended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
§ 305(a)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C.S 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (LexisNexis 2005). However, it is not clear
from the legislative history that the change in language from substantial unfitness to
unfitness was intended to reduce the quantum of proof required of the government. See
Smith v. Van Gorkom Revisited, supra note 17, at 41 n.153 (citing Jayne W. Barnard,
SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 BUS. LAW. 391, 408
(2004)).
94. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1350(c)(1)-(2)
(LexisNexis 2005).
95. § 906(c)(1)-(2).
96. This federal agency is responsible for establishing sentencing policies and
practices for the federal courts. See U.S. Sentencing Commission Homepage,
http://www.ussc.gov/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) (giving news on, links about, and the
history and practices of the U.S. Sentencing Commission).
97. Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 25.
98. Id. at 25-26.
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false financial statements in violation of Section 906 of the
Act."99 Supporters of the Act feel that Scrushy was acquitted
under Section 906 because either the case was too complicated
for the jurors or "because conviction under section 906 requires
finding of guilt for other counts of fraud."10 0
The European Union High Level Company Law Experts
reviewed whether-and, if so, how-the E.U. should coordinate
and strengthen the efforts undertaken by member states to
improve corporate governance. 101 The Experts' investigation
raised four main focus points that similarly relate to the
aforementioned discussions as a whole: 1) provision of
information for shareholders and creditors, in particular better
disclosure of corporate governance structures and practices; 2)
strengthening shareholders' rights and minority protection, in
particular supplementing the right to vote by special
investigation procedures; 3) strengthening duties of the board,
in particular the accountability of directors where the company
becomes insolvent; and 4) recognizing the need for a European
corporate governance code or coordination of national codes in
order to stimulate development of best practices and
convergence. 10 2 With specific consideration of the Enron disaster
and implementation by the United States of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the Commission reviewed issues related to best practices in
corporate governance and auditing, paying particular attention
to the role of nonexecutive and supervisory directors, the
remuneration of management, and the responsibility of
management for financial statements and auditing practices. 10 3
99. Where Is This Heading?, supra note 80, at 739-40.
100. Id. at 739-40; see Jonathan D. Glater, New Rules Make it Easy to Charge
Executives, but Not to Send Them to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005 at C5 (noting the
jury could not find Scrushy guilty under charges of fraud, and therefore could not find
him guilty under section 906).
101. EUR. COMM'N, REPORT, supra note 4, at 43.
102. Id.
103. Id; see also COMM'N OF THE EUR. CMTYs., supra note 1, at 10-11 (discussing
how recent scandals in the U.S. affected the E.U.'s approach to corporate governance).
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C. Audit Committee Independence
Section 301, which, to some extent, encompasses the
discussion above with regards to auditing, sets forth the
independence requirements for members of the audit committee
of listed companies. 10 4 Under the SEC provisions of Rule 1OA-3
(as directed by Section 301 of the Act), the audit committee
members of companies listed on securities exchanges must meet
two specific conditions with respect to auditor independence: 1)
they may not directly or indirectly accept consulting, advisory,
or any other compensatory fees from the company or its
subsidiaries other than board and committee fees; and 2) they
may not be "affiliated" persons of the company or any of its
subsidiaries.
1 0 5
Implementation of Section 301 was convoluted and
ambiguous to foreign issuers of Europe. For example, the
Section provides that issuers should have an independent audit
committee, but does not demand creation of audit committees
from registrants. 10 6 Further, in the absence of an audit
committee, the independence requirements of the Section still
must be fulfilled by all of the board members of a registrant.
0 7
Such imprecise requirements were problematic for European
companies listed in the United States, given some such
companies are incorporated under the civil law systems of their
respective countries, where the two-tier board requirement does
not provide for independent directors on the executive or
managing board level, and representatives of employees
compose half of the supervisory board. 10 8 Hence, the impact on
104. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m) (LexisNexis 2005). See
also discussion on corporate auditing supra Part III.A.
105. See Paredes, supra note 80, at 518 n.99. An "affiliated person" is one who
directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with the company or its subsidiary. Id. "'Control' means the
possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through ownership or voting securities,
by contract, or otherwise." Id. However, a person who is not the beneficial owner of at
least 10% of the voting securities of the company and is not an executive officer of the
company is not considered an "affiliated person," Id.
106. Cardilli, supra note 71, at 802.
107. Id.
108. Karmel, supra note 9, at 874.
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the different European corporate governance systems could not
be ignored. Some commentors sought for the SEC to exempt the
applicability of Section 301 based upon the doctrine of comity,109
but the supposed harshness of Section 301 was mitigated by the
SEC's final implementing rules. Under these rules, all foreign
issuers listed in the United States are exempt from the
obligation to have an audit committee, provided that: 1) the
foreign issuer has an alternative structure such as a board of
auditors according to its own national law; 2) the same board of
auditors is separate and distinct from the board of directors; 3)
no executive director is a member of the board of auditors; 4) the
board of auditors is not appointed by the board of directors; 5)
the foreign issuer's national laws provide standards that assure
the independence of the board of auditors from management;
and 6) the foreign issuer's national laws or its bylaws provide
that the board of auditors is responsible for appointing and
monitoring the activities of the outside auditor. 110
D. Code of Ethics
In light of the Enron debacle, the defects in corporate
governance also demonstrated the level to which business ethics
had ebbed, thereby revealing lessons about business leadership,
corporate regulation, and government regulation. Enron was
characterized as "a culture that valued only deal-making and
money."'111 It "failed because its leadership was morally,
ethically and financially corrupt."112 What, then, happened to
corporate governance rules? Did they fail, or were they
inadequate? As one scholar stated, "corporate governance is
fundamentally a weak check and balances approach, in that it
has historically relied on reasonably honest and honorable
managers and directors (in the face of agency theory to the
109. Id.
110. Cardilli, supra note 71, at 803.
111. See Duane Windsor, Business Ethics at "The Crooked E," in ENRON:
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 80, at 659, 676 (citation
omitted).
112. ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 12
(2002).
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contrary). 11 3  "A financial and moral corruption machine
emanating from senior management, ensnaring a trusting or
negligent board, shaped the corporate culture and ethical
climate, and ensnared the auditors, the external attorneys, and
to some degree, the politicians and regulators."' 14 In the face of
these kinds of allegations and findings, 115 SOX enacted sections
dealing with ethics. Section 406 required the SEC to implement
rules mandating: 1) implementation of a code of ethics for senior
financial officers (or persons performing similar functions) of
financial statement issuers; and 2) disclosure by the issuers of
whether or not such a code has been adopted, and, if a code has
not been adopted, the reason why.
116
These rules were also applicable to foreign issuers (over
European objection), as they were similar to the European
method of regulating corporate governance through codes and
113. Windsor, supra note 111, at 677. The cost that must be incurred by the
corporation is monitoring management to ensure their interests are aligned with those of
the shareholders. Hence, shareholders may be able to reduce agency costs by devising
incentives that would motivate management to maximize shareholder wealth. Such
incentives include stock options and bonuses. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 888-96 (1998).
114. Windsor, supra note 111, at 677. The author goes on to say the "machine" was
built around elements such as:
1) a shared ideology of free markets, deregulation and innovation; 2)
systematic attempts at political influence of legislation and regulation; 3)
Lay's philanthropic activities as (perhaps genuine) evidence of corporate
citizenship and community leadership; 4) a cynical view that greed is good,
personally and for society; 5) strong financial incentives for suborning checks
and balances; and 6) hardball tactics.
Id.
115. In the May 6, 2002 report of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Senator Patrick Leahy recommended the proposed Corporate and Criminal
Fraud Accountability Act of 2002. Id. at 673. A review of Enron's behavior revealed, inter
alia, "imprudent behavior, self-dealing, defects of moral character, company code of
conduct relaxation or violation, defects of corporate culture, and defects of corporate
governance." Id. at 673-74.
116. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406(a), 15 U.S.C.S. § 7264(a) (LexisNexis 2005)
(entitled "Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers"). The Act also required the
Commission to revise its requirements for prompt disclosure on Form 8-K by the issuing
company to also include disclosure of any change in or waiver of such code of ethics for
senior financial officers on a filed Form 8-K, or by dissemination on the Internet or other
electronic means. § 406(b).
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the subsequent compelling of issuers to disclose whether they
comply with code recommendations, and if not, why not.
117
The Act also suggested the code of ethics must include
standards reasonably necessary to promote ethical conduct in
handling conflicts of interest, disclosure in reports to be
periodically filed by, the issuer, and compliance with
governmental regulations. 118
Section 307, on the other hand, requires the SEC establish
minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
practicing before the SEC. 119 The Section also requires all
lawyers to simultaneously report evidence of a material
violation of fraud and other corporate misconduct to the
company's senior management and, if necessary, to the board of
directors. 120 This requirement is endorsed by the final 2003
rules implementing SOX provisions relating to "minimum
standards" of professional conduct-attorneys representing
issuers before the SEC are required to report violations of
securities laws, breaches of fiduciary duty, or other similar
violations by the issuer to the issuer's chief legal officer and
CEO. 12 1 If no appropriate response is provided, then the
attorney must report the evidence to the issuer's audit
committee or the board of directors. 122 The enactment of Section
307 was said to be flawed, however, because it was a usurpation
of the regulation of corporate law by the federal government
from the states.12
3
117. Karmel, supra note 9, at 869.
118. § 406(c).
119. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307(1), 15 U.S.C.S. § 7245(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
120. § 307(1)-(2).
121. § 307(1).
122. § 307(2); Cardilli, supra note 71, at 813.
123. Lawrence Fox, The Academics Have It Wrong: Hysteria is No Substitute for
Sound Public Policy Analysis, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCO AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
supra note 80, at 851, 865-66. Not only did the SEC propose and ultimately adopt a
regulation that requires lawyers for public companies to report up the corporate ladder,
but it also proposed rules "that would literally destroy confidentiality between lawyer
and corporate client, as well as pre-empt state substantive law addressing fundamental
principles of corporate governance." Id. at 864. Mr. Fox said:
[the] very idea of the Senate of the United States enacting or directing others
to enact rules of professional responsibility for lawyers should be enough to
[Vol. 29:3
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Again, the dilemma for the European community concerning
this law was it would be inequitable to foreign lawyers, due to
their conflicting home country ethics requirements and their
lack of expertise in assessing violations of U.S. laws.
124
However, these rules will tend to exclude most foreign attorneys
since the regulation applies to those licensed to practice law in
the United States. 125 Indeed, the SEC responded to foreign
concerns by excluding foreign attorneys who are not admitted to
practice in the United States and do not advise on U.S. law (or
would do so only on a consultative basis with a U.S. lawyer); also
cause collective professional indigestion and indignation. A foundation of our
independent profession is that our rules of professional conduct are
promulgated by the states. Time and again, we have quite correctly resisted
efforts to have the federal government usurp-even for lawyers employed by
the federal government-the traditional role of regulating lawyers through
the respective state Supreme Courts.
Id. at 866.
Also worth noting is Section 806 makes employees, employers, and other specified
persons civilly and criminally liable if they retaliate against "whistle blowers." Sarbanes-
Oxley of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.S. 1514A (LexisNexis 2005).
In the same vein, SEC regulation 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) allows (but does not require) an
attorney for a publiclytraded company to provide information to the SEC that would
otherwise be privileged if the attorney reasonably believes such disclosure is necessary to
1) prevent the company from committing a material violation that is likely to cause
substantial financial injury to the company or its investors; 2) stop the company from
committing or suborning perjury or fraud in an SEC proceeding; and 3) rectify the
financial consequences of a material violation in which the attorney's services were used.
Steve Seidenberg, SEC Thumps N.C. Ethics Rules, ABA J. EREPORT, Vol. 5, Mar. 31,
2006, at 13. The regulation has been controversial ever since it was promulgated on
January 29, 2003, pursuant to the Act. Id. The author further stated, although this
"reporting out" rule poses no ethical problems for attorneys in most states (because
fortytwo states have ethics rules that either allow or require attorneys to report out
under these circumstances), the remaining eight states, however, have ethics rules that
prohibit disclosure of such confidential client information. Id. Consequently, attorneys in
those states find themselves in a dilemma. Id. The extent of the dilemma was realized in
the summer of 2003 when two of the affected states, Washington and California,
asserted the SEC's rule was trumped by contrary state ethics rules. Id. However, the
SEC asserted the validity of its authority over any conflicting state ethics rules by
reiterating the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Fidelity Federal v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 41 (1982), which generally held that a federal regulation preempts conflicting state
law if the agency intended to preempt state law, and the agency action was within the
scope of its delegated authority. Seidenberg, supra note 123, at 13.
124. Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 29. Attorney-client privilege may also
become an issue.
125. Id. at 30.
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exempt are foreign practicing attorneys if their compliance with
the U.S. requirement would be prohibited by their respective
foreign law. 126
IV. CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, CONSTITUENCY STATUTES AND
SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS
The most fundamental principle of corporate governance is a
function of the allocation of power within a corporation between
its stockholders and its board of directors. 127 While the
stockholders' major power is the right to vote on specific
matters, paramount of which is the election of directors, 128 the
power to manage the corporation, on the other hand, is vested in
the corporate board, 129  which is duly elected by the
shareholders. 130 While these fundamental tenets of corporate
law provide for a separation of control and ownership, the
shareholders' franchise has been characterized as the
'ideological underpinning[s]' upon which the legitimacy of the
directors managerial power rests.
1 31
Intertwined with the power vested in management is the
corollary that they, as fiduciaries, have a principal duty to
maximize the interest of shareholders. 132 But should this always
be the case, or should some other constituencies be taken into
consideration; and, if so, when and why should the shareholder
interest become secondary? 133 In the United States, until the
126. Id. The United States has historically deferred to home country rules in so far
as it does not regulate the internal structures of foreign corporations. Id.
127. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 193.
128. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7,28; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 212 (2001).
129. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 141(a).
130. See EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 193-94.
131. Id. at 194; Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del.
Ch. 1988).
132. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (noting the
traditional view that a corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
shareholder profit).
133. "The traditional law and economic perspective holds that in determining the
maximands of the corporation, exclusive priority should be given to its residual
claimants"-the shareholders. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands Of Corporate Governance:
A Theory Of Values And Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 652 (2004). However,
others "call for 'corporate social responsibility,' holding that in addition to shareholders'
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mid-1960s, it was difficult to oust incumbent management of a
publiclytraded corporation, simply because, among other
reasons, it was difficult to acquire a corporation against the
objection of its incumbent managers (which required their
approval of the acquisition in the first place). 134 Hostile
takeovers later became an important and common method by
which to not only oust incumbent management but also to
acquire the target company. 135 In other words, a tender offer for
the shares is made by the acquirer directly to the shareholders of
the target corporation (not to the board of directors for
approval), the acquirer thereby bypassing the board and
presumably facing little or no resistance. 136
Consequently, in the late 1970s and 1980s, corporate charter
amendments were adopted by a few corporations, which allowed
directors in the face of a change in control to consider the social
and economic effects of the acquisition on the target's employees,
suppliers, customers, and others. 137 Today, many states have
statutes that permit (or in one instance require) directors and
interests, corporate officers must give weight to the interests of other corporate and
societal constituencies," such as "creditors, employees, customers, local communities and
the environment." Id. at 651.
134. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 177. The acquirer could, however, oust the
incumbent through the difficult and usually intermittently unsuccessful process of proxy
fights. Id. Proxy fights occur during elections for directors when shareholders, through
their proxy cards, can choose between two or more opposing slates of directors. Carol
Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate
Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 379, 388 (1994).
135. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 177.
136. Id. This is because, if and when successful, the acquirer may sometimes not
only oust management but actually liquidate the firm's assets and fire most or all
employees. Id. Incumbent management logically resists such takeovers by making the
corporation take defensive actions to stymie a bid. Id. The pragmatic takeover that
ostensibly dominated public perception at the time was the hostile "bust-up" takeover.
Licht, supra note 133, at 701. This public image was intensified by colorful jargon to
describe takeover activities-this jargon included words such as raiders, white knights,
poison pills, shark repellants, greenmail, etc. Id. at 701 n.205. See O'KELLY &
THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 816-17 (providing meaning and more on the jargon); see
also Anne B. Fischer, Oops! My Compdny is on the Block, FORTUNE, July 23, 1984, at 16
(discussing why, with the impact of the merger and acquisition boom at that time and
with management's defensive responses, stricter regulations of mergers and acquisitions
were inevitable).
137. Licht, supra note 133, at 701.
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officers of corporations chartered within their states to consider
the interests of other constituencies beyond the corporation's
shareholders, at least in certain situations, particularly with a
change of control. 138 Delaware, a renowned state in regards to
corporate law, which did not formally adopt a constituency
statute per se, stated in its 1985 supreme court decision, Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 1 3 9 that, in analyzing the effect of
an imminent takeover on the "corporate enterprise," the
directors may consider its "impact on 'constituencies' other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally)."' 40 The Delaware court qualified
its decision in Mesa by stating in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes, Inc. that, once the target firm was clearly going to be
sold, the duty of the target's board "changed from the
preservation of [the target firm] as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
138. Id. at 702. It is worthwhile to note that the federal Williams Act of 1933
regulated some aspects of takeover. Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate
Governance: Some Points of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 51, 54 (1998); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f). However,
legislative history indicates that congressional policy was to adopt a neutral position
between the interests of incumbent managers and those of bidders. Id. The Act,
therefore, was generally consistent with this intermediate position, not unduly favoring
bidders or targets. Id. The Act imposed some "regulation on the terms and procedure for
takeover bids, require[d] prebid disclosure and create[d] a fraud remedy for
communications concerning an offer." Id.
139. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
140. Id. at 955. Courts in other jurisdictions followed the Delaware standard and
approved constituencies' statutes, with the shareholder benefit considered to be of
paramount consideration. Licht, supra note 133, at 702 n.210; see also, e.g., Amanda
Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 877
F.2d 496 (7th Cir.1989); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ('The protection of loyal employees, including managers, of the
organization is not anathema ... legitimate concerns for their past conduct of the
enterprise and its requirements need not be left to the goodwill of an unfriendly acquirer
of corporate control in the jungle warfare involving attempted takeovers,").
Other forms of such statutes included laws restricting the voting rights of shares
acquired by a bidder in a takeover unless the remaining shareholders approve (control
share statutes); laws restricting rights of a winning bidder to consummate a merger or
other business combination with the target for a substantial period of time after the bid
(business combination freeze statutes); and provisions requiring the bidder to pay as
much at the freezeout stage of an acquisition as it pays to tendering shareholders in the
takeover bid (fair price rules). See Miller, supra note 138, at 55.
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stockholders' benefit."'14 1 In other words the "board may have
regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders."' 42  Apparently, the board's
responsibilities under Unocal were altered in that the directors'
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders. 143 Subsequently, the same Delaware court held in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.144 that "directors
are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate
plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly-
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy."'145 Although when
looked at as a whole, these Delaware cases tend to show an
erratic approach in regulating incumbent managers' duties in
responding to unsolicited takeover bids, one thing appears to be
consistent in these cases: the Delaware courts tend to give
victory to the party which (when considering marketplace
realities of the bid) is most likely to end up with control over the
assets; that is, "the Delaware courts pick winners."'
46
Regardless of case law, the widespread adoption of constituency
141. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del 1985).
142. Id. at 182; see also E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform
Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices-Or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
2179, 2184 (2001) ("[T]he interests of stockholders are primary and may not be trumped
by that of other constituencies, although those interests may be considered if congruent
with interests of the stockholders.").
143. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. Revlon therefore appeared to be "restricting the
power of incumbent managers to control the takeover process." See Miller, supra note
138, at 57.
144. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). Here,
Time's management rejected an all-cash offer from Paramount that was financially
better than a proposed merger by Warner Brothers. Id. at 1142. The court held the deal
with Warner Brothers did not trigger the Revlon duty to auction and Time's response to
Paramount was reasonable to the threat posed. Id. However, the court retracted from
this position in Paramount Commc'ns Inc v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). See
Miller, supra note 138, at 57 ("Paramount's board [of directors] approved a merger with
Viacom and adopted defensive measures to block an unsolicited, more valuable tender
offer from QVC Network."). Here the court held that "the Revlon duties applied to
actions of Paramount's board, and [the board was therefore in breach of its fiduciary]
duty by rejecting the QVC bid." Id. at 57-58.
145. Time, 571 A.2d at 1154.
146. See Miller, supra note 138, at 58.
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statutes in the United States, whether in takeovers or
otherwise, at least demonstrates a trend, and, therefore, is here
to stay.
147
What is the position of foreign countries and, in particular,
the European Union?148 The American corporate governance
system, as seen above, adheres to the idea of shareholder
primacy. Because the United Kingdom, Austria, and Canada
share a legal system based on English common law and equity
principles, they are similar to the United States-shareholder
primacy is the predominant norm in each of these countries. In
England, for example, Section 309 of the Companies Act of 1985
requires incumbent managers to take into account the interests
of employees as well as shareholders when making decisions
about takeovers, hence the applicability of the equivalence of
constituency statutes in the United States. 149 Indeed, case law
in England emphasizes that fundamental decisions regarding
takeovers are the prerogative of shareholders and not
management. 150 Hence, management action that may serve to
147. As part of an effort by state legislatures to protect local companies and jobs,
about thirty states have adopted other constituency statutes, with most of them
providing that in determining the best interest of the corporation, directors may consider
the interests of suppliers, employees, customers, and affected communities. See O'KELLY
& THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 266-67. Thus it is obvious that these statutes broaden
the direction entrusted to directors beyond takeovers. See id. For example, a
controversial 1990 Pennsylvania statute states that "directors ... shall not be
required . . . to regard any corporate interest or the interests of any particular group
affected by such action as a dominant or controlling interest or factor." 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 1715(b) (1990).
148. The OECD Principles IV reiterates that "[tihe corporate governance
framework should recogni[z]e the rights of stakeholders as established by law... and
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth,
jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises." OECD, OECD PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 21 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/
31557724.pdf. OECD Principle VI also states that "[t]he board should.., take into
account the interests of stakeholders," with the annotation explaining "boards are
expected to take due regard of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder interests
including those of employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and local communities." Id.
at 24, 58. In the same vein, the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) is
in agreement with OECD that the board should be accountable to shareholders and
responsible for managing successful and productive relationships with the corporation's
stakeholders. Id. at 58.
149. Miller, supra note 138, at 59 n.17.
150. Id. at 59. In Hogg, where the court held even if the incumbent board honestly
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defeat such shareholder control falls outside the scope of
delegated management authority.
151
On the other hand, some countries such as Germany and
Japan feature stronger protection for the employees, creditors,
and other nonshareholder constituencies as a whole-a prime
example of a stakeholder-orientated system.152  German
corporate law creates a fiduciary duty between managers and a
diverse group of constituencies, including shareholders,
employees, and society. 153 Consequently, the hallmark of the
corporate system is its codetermination regime-a regime that
provides employees with structural protection through
representation in corporate institutions. 154  Therefore, the
German two-tiered board calls for the companies to be managed
by a managing board (Vorstand) 155 that conducts day-to-day
business of the firm and a supervisory council (Aufsichtsrat)
156
that elects and monitors the firm's management and approves
major corporate decisions. 157 Similarly, in Austria, Denmark,
believed keeping the management of the company in the hands of the incumbent board
would be more advantageous to the shareholders than if it was taken over, such a
decision properly belonged to the shareholders and not management. See id. (citing Hogg
v. Cramphorn, Ltd., [1967] Ch. 254, 265 (1963)).
151. Id.
152. See Licht, supra note 133, at 734-37.
153. Id. at 734-35.
154. Id. at 735.
155. Id. The managing board is usually appointed by the members of the
supervisory board. Id.
156. Id. at 735. Members are comprised of representatives of shareholders and
workers. David Charny, Special Symposium Issue: The German Coporate Governance
System, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 145, 149 (1998). These shareholder representatives,
as a practical matter, are usually representatives of the main creditor groups, the
banks. Id.
157. Miller, supra note 138, at 735. "Private corporations with five hundred or
more employees and public corporations organized under German law are required to
have [such] a two-tiered board structure," with "supervisory functions in the first-tier
board, the aufsichtsrtat (supervisory board), and management function in the vorstand,
the second-tier board (management board)." Lynn L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of
Corporate Boards of Directors: The Dual Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
91, 138 (1997). The supervisory Voard supervises management. Id. This two-tiered
system is similar to the unitary boards in the United States, where the board of directors
is designed to supervise management. Id. The U.S. boards appoint and determine the
compensation of senior executives. Id. In the same vein, the German supervisory board
appoints and determines the compensation of directors on the management board. Id.
20071
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Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden, employee
participation in the supervisory board is mandated. 158 France,
Ireland, Portugal, and other E.U. member states have enacted
laws that merely include aspects of employee participation in
corporate governance. 159  For example, in France, when
employees' shareholding reaches 3%, employees are given the
right to nominate one or more directors subject to certain
exceptions. 160 Although employee representation on the board
does not give them decision-making power per se, their
structural involvement as nonshareholder constituencies of the
firm is effective in mitigating informational asymmetries,
thereby facilitating informal negotiations among corporate
constituencies. 
161
Because company law is one area of law that is criticized for
not keeping up with the integration process of the European
Union, 162 much work is underway to maximize harmonization,
in spite of the obvious differences and inherent difficulties in
doing SO. 1 6 3 One major area in which this has occurred is
However, the German supervisory board has less control over management and the
corporation. Id. For the German boards, this formal structure with the division of
interest representation among different groups and its confinement to a separate board
is said to foster managerial dominance. See Charny, supra note 156, at 149. This
managerial dominance translates into advantages such as superior access to
information, control over information flow to the supervisory board (monitors), de facto
independence in day-to-day decision making, and so forth. See id. at 149-50.
158. Licht, supra note 133, at 735 (citing Luca Enriques, Silence Is Golden: The
European Company Statute as Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage, ECGI Law Working
Paper No. 07/2003, at 10 n. 38 (2003); COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 1, at 44.
159. See Licht, supra note 133, at 735 n.338 (citing Uwe Blaurock, Steps Towards a
Uniform Corporate Law in the European Union, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 377, 390 (1998);
Karel Lannoo, A European Perspective on Corporate Governance, 37 JOURNAL OF
COMMON MARKET STUDIES 269 (1999), available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.coml
doilpdfl0.1111/1468-5965.00163).
160. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 1, at 34.
161. Licht, supra note 133, at 735-36.
162. See Andrea J. Gildea, Uberseering: A European Company Passport, 30
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 257, 258 n.8 (2004).
163. Some corporate governance harmonization challenges stem from the fact (as
discussed supra) that, in some member states, the governance issues center primarily on
the ability of the supervisory body, in either the supervisory board (in a two-tier system)
or a board of directors (in a unitary system), to hold managers accountable to a relatively
dispersed group of shareholders; while, in other member states, issues center around
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takeovers. By harmonizing takeover law, the E.U. has furthered
its underlying goal of creating a larger union of member states
and taking advantage of the economic power and growth that a
larger union could generate. 164 After the announcement of a
takeover bid, a management board may not take any action
outside the ordinary course of business that could prevent the
offer from being successful unless it is specifically authorized in
a general meeting. 165 In a dual board system, this authorization
may be given by the supervisory board-assuming that both
boards represent the interests of the company. 166 In other
words, the boards have the authority to take action against a
hostile takeover if they both agree on the same strategy. 167 The
board is to act in the best interest of the corporation, 168 but,
because of the different corporate structure that exists in
Europe, it may be difficult to determine what the company's best
interest is (or even to establish who is entitled to define it),
especially during a takeover bid. 169 Unfortunately, there has
been no consensus (and therefore no national rules adopted)
regulating takeover bids in Europe because of friction-and
perhaps national pride. 170 Presently, it appears that only the
protecting minority shareholders to ensure fair treatment where there is a dominant
shareholder, as well as ensuring that a dominant shareholder does not overly influence
supervisory and managerial bodies. See COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 1, at 33.
164. See Barbara White, Conflicts in the Regulation of Hostile Business Takeovers
in the United States and the European Union, 9 IUS GENTIUM 161, 181-82 (2003).
165. Viviane de Beaufort, National Systems or European Harmonization of
Corporate Governance? Approach to the Consequences of the Application of Corporate
Governance Principles During a Takeover Bid in the European Union, 1 INT'L J. OF
DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 372, 375 (2004).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 377-78 (discussing failed attempts to achieve consensus in the
E.U.). Different countries within the E.U., as a result of feeling invaded by other
countries' corporate entrepreneurs, are questioning whether indeed all barriers be
removed to allow free flow of productive resources. White, supra note 164, at 183. For
example, when the French executives, out of their own frustration with the Italians
making inroads into ownership of French companies, assisted Societe Generale de
Belgique to fend off the hostile Italian entrepreneur De Benedetti's efforts to acquire
shareholder control, it became apparent Europeans needed some rules.and regulations of
takeover activity. Id. However, the paradox is that, while in the end, $3 billion (USD)
2007]
HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
United Kingdom has an effective takeover regulation. 171
England's openness to hostile takeovers is reflected in its large
number of successful takeover bids; in fact, England is the host
of 90% of all European takeovers.172 England's takeovers tend to
be governed by market forces rather than private or public
regulation. 173 It seems even more apparent national pride and
other considerations make it even harder to attain national
regulation. By looking at Germany's actions or rationale prior to
the European Parliament's failed vote on the E.U.'s directive for
regulating hostile takeovers, one can see the goal may be
farfetched. 174 Germany implemented takeover legislation in
November 2001, basically following the principle of maximizing
shareholder value, providing for full disclosure to shareholders
and granting the target board some limited power to adopt
defensive measures under certain conditions. 175 The E.U.'s
proposed measure, which was rejected by Germany because of
the E.U.'s strongly-held position that target boards behave
neutrally in the face of a hostile bid, was in opposition to
Germany's measure of granting the target board the ability to
take defensive measures in the face of a hostile bid. 176
Germany's negative vote created a deadlock at the European
Parliament in July 2001, in spite of the fact the E.U. draft had
adopted fifteen amendments to allow for national differences. 177
Germany nonetheless passed its 2001 legislation, which became
was spent collectively by all sides in the takeover war; Societe Generale itself was only
worth about half that amount, per stock market prices. See id. Likewise, this hostile
takeover war also made it obvious that the intrinsic nature of the companies in each
nation needed to be reexamined, because the structures themselves often prohibited free
movements of resources that would assist existing companies in becoming more efficient.
Id. at 183-84.
171. See White, supra note 164, at 183.
172. See Miller, supra note 138, at 60 (citing Mervyn King, Take-Over Activity in
the United Kingdom, in MERGERS AND MERGER POLICY 99 (James Fairburn & John Kays
eds., 1989); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 136 (1993)).
173. See Miller, supra note 138, at 60.
174. See White, supra note 164, at 184.
175. Id. at 185-87. The measures adopted by the board, if falling within the scope
of shareholder authority, must be approved by the current shareholders before the bid is
made. Id. at 185-86.
176. Id. at 185-87.
177. Id. at 186-87.
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effective in January 2002, with no E.U. takeover directive in
force-although a new proposal is being developed. 178 Hence,
although shareholder wealth maximization is the most widely-
held method for promoting economic growth and efficiency, it is
certainly not the only one that will achieve positive economic
ends.
179
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the European
Commission's Action Plan to modernize company law and
enhance corporate governance in the European Union
apparently has broadly identified the same problems and goals
as the United States. In responding to perceived market failure
(as depicted by Enron and its progeny), to generate dependable
corporate governance, the United States seemingly replaced its
traditional reliance on state law, self-regulatory organization
rules, and best practice codes with government-mandated
uniform requirements (a one-size-fits-all law), 180 with the hope
of dealing with and preventing similar corporate governance
failure. As a result, the United States moved towards greater
regulation (while Europe has been traditionally heavily-
regulated domestically) and now is moving away from
178. Id. at 187.
179. Id. at 190. There is still support for deviations from the perfect shareholder
maximization model. See id. at 195 n.27 (citing Mark Roe, Can Culture Constrain the
Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251 (2002); Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraackman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 458
(2001)). In the same vein, some studies have examined differences in economic structure:
the degree of shareholder diffusion compared with concentrated controlling blocks, the
liquidity of the country's securities markets, and the country's relationship to ownership
concentration. Id. at 192. Other studies examined the difference in corporate governance:
the role of shareholders in the decision-making process, the role of financial
intermediaries, and the role that unions play. Id. Yet others look at the political and
governmental institutions: the impact of E.U. activities, the reach of U.S. laws abroad,
different countries' regulations of takeover, or the impact of the law itself in providing
protections and disruptions. Id. See id. at 191-94 (providing more citations and
discussion on the issue).
180. Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 31. The passing of SOX signals a move
away from reliance on marketdriven rule-creating mechanisms towards legislative rule-
creation and, accordingly, towards greater government involvement and increased
centralization. See id.
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prescriptive, national legislation in corporate governance and
attempting to embrace a more uniform law. Unfortunately, this
adoption of a uniform approach to corporate governance has
been hampered by inherent factors, such as different corporate
governance structures among member states. For example, the
European Commission, in its Action Plan, acknowledged the
virtual impossibility of creating a single E.U. corporate
governance code, and instead opted to rely on disclosure as a tool
to promote good corporate governance; and on a substantive
level, the E.U. sought only to adopt a common approach covering
a few essential rules.18 '
In other words, as with SOX (which required compliance or,
failing this, disclosure as to why a corporation is unable to so
comply), the E.U. approach to corporate governance is one of
self-regulation by corporate governance codes; public companies
then reveal whether or not they are in compliance.1 82 As such,
companies are expected to make an annual statement disclosing
compliance or explaining their failures to comply with national
codes of corporate conduct.
Does this mean corporate governance systems between the
United States and the European Union are following converging
trends? If so, one would expect this to be even more obvious with
the extraterritorial application of SOX to foreign companies
registered on the U.S. stock markets. 183
It is worth noting that the E.U. initiatives (at various stages
of adoption and implementation) also have the potential to
create new, significant regulatory obligations for both E.U. and
non-E.U. companies, such as the United States.
However, an expected convergence is not necessarily the
case within Europe, where the diversity of firm structures, the
fragmentation of political and economic power, the role of
employees in corporate governance in some states, the primacy
of shareholder interests, the rights of minority shareholders,
181. See id. at 32-33.
182. See Karmel, supra note 9, at 887-88.
183. Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 33. Like the United States, the European
corporate governance codes emphasize the need for effective separation of managers and
supervisors, including a prohibition on a company's CEO also serving as its chairman.
Id. at 32.
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board structures, and relationships between management and
supervisory body all differ so greatly and consequentially that
no common system is apparent or likely to emerge. 184 Logically,
it follows without uniform corporate governance in Europe, a
substantive convergence between the United States and Europe
is unlikely, 185  leaving the somewhat amicable option of
recognizing each other's systems as the best way forward.
Mutual recognition is ideal, as no system is assumed to be
optimal; each is accepted as equally valid, subject to its
compliance with certain core principles.
186
Overall, therefore, the spate of new legislation and
regulation on both sides of the Atlantic underscores the need for
U.S. and European business communities to work together for
their common good. Cooperation, therefore, should no longer be
a matter of courtesy, but rather, obligation. This does not mean
the business communities will have to adopt an identical
approach; instead, they should agree to make their different
approaches mutually consistent and effective in achieving the
same goals. A very good example of this approach is the
converging of International Accounting Standards and U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
187
Regardless of which side of the Atlantic one is referring to, it
is undoubtedly true corporate governance has drawn
tremendous attention in light of a growing consensus that an
effective corporate governance system may be a crucial
precondition for a thriving and sustainable market economy.
184. See Cadilli, supra note 70 at 817 (observing that these differences cause the
European Union hardships when promulgating common standards for corporate
transactions and behavior).
185. Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 33. One impediment to complete
convergence is explained by the philosophical approach to governance regulations, with a
distinction being made between: 1) a principlesbased approach to governance, one in
which guidelines are clear, but compliance with them is voluntary; and 2) a lawbased or
rule-based approach to governance, where the legislation, regulations, and stock
exchange listing requirements relating to governance are very detailed. See Garrett,
supra note 62, at 149.
186. Greene & Boury, supra note 11, at 33. Mutual recognition is said to be ideal
because it would allow capital-market unification without requiring burdensome legal
unification, a process that would generate unacceptable costs, as exemplified by the
extraterritorial application of SOX. Id.
187. See Cardilli, supra note 71, at 820.
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